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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2003, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") revised its
Telemarketing Sales Rule ("TSR") to establish a national Do-Not-Call
Registry for commercial telemarketing.' Thereafter, Congress directed the
Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") to coordinate its
* Professor of Business Law at the Henry W. Bloch School of Business and Public
Administration, University of Missouri-Kansas City. She gratefully acknowledges the
funding for this research from the Kemper Foundation.
1. FTC Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 4580, 4584-85 (Jan. 29, 2003)
(codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 310).
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telemarketing regulations under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
("TCPA") of 19912 to achieve maximum consistency between the two
agencies' telemarketing restrictions. 3 Now, the two agencies enforce a
single list containing the personal telephone numbers of consumers who do
not wish to receive calls from telemarketers.4 Based on the agencies'
different statutory authorities, some parties are exempt from the FTC rule
(banks and insurance companies for example) but are covered by the FCC
rules. Nonprofit solicitation is exempt from the national Do-Not-Call
Registry,5 but is covered by other provisions of the FTC rule.6 The TSR
created a new in-house no-call list requirement and imposed additional
restrictions not previously known for nonprofit solicitors.7 These
restrictions apply, however, only if a commercial telemarketer is
conducting the solicitation call.8
The federal Do-Not-Call System does not preempt any existing state
registry.9 Many states have merged their registries with the federal list,
saving their residents from having to register twice. Some states, however,
believe their systems provide better consumer protection, usually because
of narrower exceptions. These states will continue to enforce their lists
separately.' ° Most states exempt nonprofit solicitation from their
requirements. North Dakota had rules that covered nonprofit solicitation if
it was conducted by a for-profit telemarketer, similar to the FTC
construct."
In 2004, the Tenth Circuit Federal Court of Appeals upheld the
validity of the new federal Do-Not-Call Registry. 2 The Supreme Court

2. Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2002).
3. Do-Not-Call Implementation Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2003).
4. 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(l)(iii)(B) (2003).
5. 16 C.F.R. § 310.6(a).
6. Restrictions on Telemarketing and Telephone Solicitation, 47 C.F.R. §
64.1200(c)(2) (2003).
7. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d)(3).
8. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(9).
9. Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (e)(l) (2000). See Stephen M.
Worth, "Do Not Call" Laws and the First Amendment: Testing the Limits of Commercial
Free Speech Protection,7 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 467 (2003). See generally Augusta
Meacham, To Call or Not to Call? An Analysis of Current Charitable Telemarketing
Regulations, 12 COMMLAw CONSPEcTUs 61 (2004) [hereinafter To Call or Not to Call?].
10. See Joseph Lewczak and Sofia Rahman, PracticalSuggestions for Complying with
the National Do Not Call Registry, METRO. CORP. COUNSEL, Feb. 2004, at 18. See also To
Call or Not to Call?, supra note 9.
11. Fraternal Order of Police v. Stenehjem, 287 F. Supp. 2d 1023.(D.N.D. 2003).
12. Mainstream Mktg. Servs. v. FTC, 358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004).
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declined to hear the matter on appeal, leaving the Mainstream Marketing
opinion as the final constitutional law regarding the national Do-Not-Call
List. 3 Nevertheless, its outcome expressly does not apply to any
solicitation on behalf of nonprofit organizations. 4 The separate nonprofit
provisions of the TSR raise different issues regarding the scope of FTC
authority and First Amendment rights of nonprofit organizations. These
regulations are being disputed in separate litigation from the challenge to
the national Do-Not-Call Registry. 5
This Article looks at the current state of regulatory activity targeting
charitable telephone solicitation. First, the Article examines the FTC's
authority to adopt the provisions of the TSR that apply to nonprofit
organizations. 6 Second, this Article explains the free speech jurisprudence
that charitable solicitation cannot be regulated like other commercial
messages. 7 Finally, the Article looks at the new FTC restrictions on
nonprofit solicitation to determine if they can withstand Constitutional
scrutiny."

II. FTC STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO REGULATE NONPROFIT
SOLICITATION
The FTC's restrictions on nonprofit solicitation are based on new
mandates under the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Interrupt and Obstruct Terrorism Act of
2001 ("USA PATRIOT Act").' 9 Often lost in the public debate regarding
the USA PATRIOT Act are the provisions that swept charitable solicitation
into existing telemarketing statutes. Previously, telephone solicitation by
nonprofit organizations had been exempt from the federal Telemarketing
and Consumer Fraud and Prevention Abuse Act, which is the FTC's
statutory authority underlying the Telemarketing Sales Rule. 20 Nonprofit
13. Id. See generally James Sweet, Opting-out of Commercial Telemarketing: The
Constitutionalityof the National Do-Not-Call Registry, 70 TENN. L. REV. 921, 963 (2003).
See also Rita Marie Cain, Federal Do Not Call Registry is Here to Stay. What's Next for
DirectMarketing Regulation?, 19 J. OF INTERACTIVE MKTG. (forthcoming Jan. 2005).
14. MainstreamMktg. Servs., 358 F. 3d at 1233 n.2.

15. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind v. FTC, 303 F. Supp. 2d 707 (D. Md. 2004).
16. See discussion infra Section II.
17. See discussion infra Sections III.A. and II.B.
18. See discussion infra Section III.C.

19. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified at scattered
sections of 18 U.S.C.).
20. Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 610108 (1996).
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solicitation is also exempt from the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of
1991, which is the FCC's statutory authority for regulating telemarketing. 2'
Section 101 (b) of the USA PATRIOT Act amends the definition of
"telemarketing" in the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse
Prevention Act to include any telephone solicitation program conducted to
induce "a charitable contribution, donation, or gift of money or any other
thing of value." 22 Further, the definition of a "deceptive practice" under the
Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act was
amended to include "fraudulent charitable solicitation."23 Although not
stated in the USA PATRIOT Act, the FTC concluded that these
amendments only apply to charitable solicitations conducted by
commercial telemarketers on behalf of nonprofit organizations. According
to the FTC, nonprofit organizations are exempt from the FTC's general
statutory authority to regulate unfair and deceptive trade practices.24 The
USA PATRIOT Act did not expand the FTC's basic statutory authority.
Thus, the only way to reconcile the USA PATRIOT Act with the FTC's
existing power over for-profit firms is to conclude that the USA PATRIOT
Act only enables the FTC to regulate charitable solicitation conducted by
commercial telemarketers.25
Arguably, the FTC's interpretation of this statutory authority under
the USA PATRIOT Act is too limited to effectuate the Act's purpose. The
legislative history of the Act, in the weeks following the September 11
attacks, makes it clear that Congress wanted to tackle the problem of
fraudulent charitable solicitors who funneled donations to terrorists. 26
This legislative objective will not be met if the regulations focus only
21. Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2002).
22. USA PATRIOT Act § 101 l(b)(3) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6016).
23. USA PATRIOT Act § 1011(b)(l) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6102).
24. The Commission's authority extends to "persons, partnerships and
corporations .... 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2004). Most charitable and other nonprofit
organizations fail to meet the profit-oriented definition of a corporation under the Act. See
15 U.S.C. § 44 (2004).
25. FrC Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 4580, 4584-85 (Jan. 29, 2003)
(codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 310).
26. The synopsis of the Act states that it is intended "[T]o deter and punish terrorist acts
in the United States and around the world, to enhance law enforcement investigatory tools,
and for other purposes." USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
Another portion of the Act is entitled Cooperative Efforts to Deter Money Laundering and
specifically authorizes cooperative procedures among financial institutions, regulatory
authorities and law enforcement related to the "means by which terrorist groups transfer
funds around the world and within the United States, including through the use of charitable
organizations, nonprofit organizations, and nongovernmental organizations .. " USA
PATRIOT Act § 314 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5311).
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on the solicitation conducted by commercial solicitors and not on the
defrauding charities themselves. Potentially, if sham charities were
soliciting funds to funnel to terrorists, they would not hire a third-party firm
to conduct their solicitation. Such a relationship with a commercial
telemarketing vendor would require contracts, payments by check or credit
card between the firms, and some interaction between the telemarketer and
the persons representing the sham charity. Presumably, if a sham charity
were trying to launder funds to terrorists, it would try to limit paper trails
and third-party contacts regarding its illegal activities. Arguably, it would
keep the telemarketing function within the organization of fellow
conspirators.
Another interpretation of the USA PATRIOT Act is that, for the
purpose of regulating fraudulent charitable solicitation, the FTC's original
jurisdiction is expanded to include all solicitors whether their legal status is
commercial or noncommercial.2 7 This interpretation would better
accomplish the regulatory objective of the USA PATRIOT Act (and would
sidestep the constitutional sticking point, discussed below, that the FTC is
unfairly regulating the free speech of those charities that must outsource
their solicitation activities to for-profit firms).2"
Whether or not the FIC is correct in limiting its approach to
commercial parties soliciting for nonprofits, there is still a question whether
the FTC could use the USA PATRIOT Act's mandates to impose privacy
protections on nonprofit solicitation. These privacy protections include the
in-house do-not-call list, time-of-day restrictions and technical
requirements for autodialing equipment.29 By enacting the USA PATRIOT
Act, Congress targeted fraudulent charitable solicitation as part of a law
enforcement regime designed to prevent money laundering for terrorist
activity. Arguably, the USA PATRIOT Act does not support the FTC's
move to also extend its various personal privacy restrictions to charitable
solicitation.
The FTC addressed this point by stating that nothing in the USA
PATRIOT Act suggested that Congress sought to exclude nonprofit

27. Telemarketing Review, Comments and Recommendations National Association of
State Charity Officials, FTC File No. R41 1001 at 3-5 (Apr. 16, 2002) at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/dncpapercomments/04/nasco.pdf.
28. See discussion infra Section III.C. In addition, for the purposes of this Article,
unless otherwise noted, references to nonprofit or charitable solicitation under the FTC rule
implies solicitation done by commercial telemarketers on behalf of the nonprofit
organization.
29. FTC Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. at 4581, 4582 n.24, 4592.
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solicitation from the privacy provisions of the TSR.3 ° Under this approach,
Congress would have to tell a federal agency what powers it is not
bestowing when it enacts enabling legislation. The FTC also argues that the
USA PATRIOT Act rewrote the general definition of "telemarketing" to
include nonprofit solicitation.3' Accordingly, Congress altered the scope of
the TSR, and thus empowered the FTC to exercise any or all of its
Telemarketing Act authority over nonprofit solicitation.32
While the USA PATRIOT Act amends the definition of telemarketing
to include charitable solicitation, it does not stop there. The statute actually
goes beyond the general and states one, and only one, specific
telemarketing restriction for the FTC to address-disclosure.3 3 The
disclosure requirements serve the dual purpose of fraud and privacy
protection. Providing identifying information allows potential donors to
investigate the organization before agreeing to contribute. After
contributing, if donors have reason to suspect the charity is questionable,
they have the identifying information to forward to law enforcement. These
disclosure requirements also protect in-home privacy by allowing
consumers to terminate the call immediately upon hearing the nature and
source of the call.
The FTC asserts that the USA PATRIOT Act's general definition of
telemarketing injected charitable solicitation into all the provisions of the
TSR.34 This interpretation of the general definitions in the Act ignores the
new, more specific mandates. Arguably, if Congress were authorizing the
FTC to consider any other possible telemarketing regulations for
nonprofits, such as the Do-Not-Call List requirement, it would not have
expressly singled out disclosure in the legislation. In other words, once
Congress expressed one specific requirement that the FTC could impose on
nonprofit solicitation, the FTC was not free to assume blanket authority
over nonprofit telemarketing.
At least one United States senator put the FTC on notice of his
contrary interpretation of the USA PATRIOT Act. In a June 14, 2002, letter
to FTC Chairman Timothy Muris, Senator Mitch McConnell commented
on the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking:
30. FTC Telemarketing Sales Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. 4492, 4493 (Jan. 30, 2002) (codified
at 16 C.F.R. pt. 310).
31. Id.
32. FTC Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 4580 (Jan. 29, 2003) (codified at 16
C.F.R. pt. 310).
33. 15 U.S.C.S. § 6102(a)(3)(C)(D) (Supp. 2004); 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(e) (2004).
34. FTC Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. at 4585 n.52.
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In an effort to protect generous citizens and the charitable institutions
they support, I was proud to introduce the Crimes Against Charitable
Americans Act and secure its inclusion in the USA PATRIOT Act.
This legislation strengthens federal laws regulating charitable phone
solicitations.... When Congress enacted this legislation, it did not
envision, nor did it call for, the PTC to propose a federal "do-not-call"
list, and certainly not a list that applied to charitable organizations or
their authorized agents.
36
The only court to address the issue to date has agreed with the FTC.
According to the Federal District Court of Maryland, the applicable
provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act were amendments to the
Telemarketing Act.37 The original Telemarketing Act instructed the FTC to

38
enact rules to prevent fraud and protect privacy. From this authority
emerged the original Telemarketing Sales Rule. Thus, the court opined, by
adding charitable solicitation to the definition of "telemarketing" used in
the TSR, Congress must have recognized "all the telemarketing rules
would apply to charitable solicitation."39 As for the views of Senator
McConnell, "the statements of one Congressman cannot be treated40 as a
statute.
definitive recitation of Congress' purpose with respect to the

III. FREE SPEECH PROTECTION FOR CHARITABLE SOLICITATION
Shortly after the Supreme Court expressly extended free speech
protection for advertising in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council,4' it was faced with various challenges to state

charitable solicitation laws. Typically, these regulations targeted the use of
paid commercial solicitors for charitable fund raising. The regulations
primarily were based on the government's interest in preventing fraudulent
solicitation. The Supreme Court had to decide how the commercial speech
doctrine applied to solicitation on behalf of nonprofit organizations.
35. FTC Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. at 4585 n.50 (quoting a letter from
United States Senator Mitch McConnell). In 2003, Congress passed the follow-up Do-NotCall Implementation Act, which gave the FTC authority to impose the fee structure for the
Do-Not-Call Registry. Do-Not-Call Implementation Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6101 (2003). The Act
is widely seen as a congressional imprimatur for the Registry. Nevertheless, since the
national Do-Not-Call Registry specifically exempts all calling for nonprofit solicitation,
whether done by commercial or noncommercial solicitors, this subsequent Act by Congress
does not address the FTC's tactics regarding nonprofit solicitation.
36. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind v. FTC, 303 F. Supp. 2d 707 (D. Md. 2004).
37. Id.at 711.
38. Id.at 710.
39. Id. at 714 n.3.
40. Id.
41. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
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Fraudas a Compelling Interestto Support Regulation of
Nonprofit Solicitation under the TSR

In Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment,
the
Supreme Court struck down a regulation that prohibited charitable
solicitation unless 75 percent of the receipts were used "directly
for
charitable purpose of the organization."42 The government's
primary
objective for the rule was to protect citizens from unscrupulous
solicitors
and to protect legitimate charities from the black eye created
by
disreputable organizations.4 3 The Village of Schaumburg surmised
that an
organization using more than 25 percent of its receipts for salaries
and
overhead was a for-profit enterprise, not a charity. ' Residential
privacy
also was articulated as a justification for such rules, as
in most
telemarketing regulation today.45
Schaumburg concluded that the 25 percent threshold did not reliably
explain whether an enterprise was either commercial or charitable
and the
threshold addressed the fraud concern "only peripherally."46 The Court
held
that the anti-fraud interest could be served by penal laws that prohibit
and
punish fraud directly, rather than by approaches that restrict solicitation.47
Schaumburg also noted that charitable solicitation has not been
regulated as "purely commercial speech."48 The Court explained
that
charitable solicitation "is characteristically intertwined with informative
and perhaps persuasive speech seeking support for particular causes
or for
particular views on economic, political, or social
issues...."49
Accordingly, speech by charitable organizations, even when
soliciting
contributions, receives the highest First Amendment protection, the
same as
is available to all other political or social speech.
Thereafter, the Court invalidated a Maryland statute that prohibited
charities from fundraising if they paid the solicitor more than 25 percent
of
the amount raised.5" Maryland had tried to avoid the Schaumburg
result by
including a waiver of the 25 percent limitation if the restriction
would

42. 444 U.S. 620, 624 (1980) (citing Schaumburg Village Code § 22-20).
43. Id. at 636.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 638.
46. Id. at 636.
47. Id. at 637.
48. Id. at 632.
49. Id.
50. Sec'y of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson, Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984).
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effectively prevent the organization from raising funds.5 Secretary of
Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson, Co. noted that this regulation was based on
the same fundamentally flawed premise as in Schaumburg: that high
solicitation costs are an accurate measure of fraud.52 The Court explained
that high solicitation costs could result from using the fundraising process
to disseminate information." Solicitation expenses are not excessive if they
stem from the unpopularity of the charity's cause.54 Again the Court
explained that more direct regulatory measures could check fraud, this time
citing financial disclosures by the charities as a meaningful option.5
In the final case in this trilogy, the Court invalidated a North Carolina
statute that directly regulated professional fundraisers and the fees they
could charge.56 Fees above 35 percent were presumed unreasonable.57 Fees
between 20 and 35 percent could be deemed unreasonable if the State could
show that the solicitation efforts did not include advocacy or dissemination
of information.58 Fees below 20 percent were presumed reasonable.59
Targeting the commercial solicitor with this regulation did not resolve
the free speech issue. Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North
Carolina, Inc. concluded that solicitation conducted by commercial
telemarketers on behalf of nonprofit organizations is afforded the same
First Amendment protection. Speech is not entitled to less protection
simply because the speaker is compensated for the message.6" "[T]he
State's asserted power to license professional fundraisers carries with it
(unless properly constrained) the power directly and substantially to affect
the speech they utter."'" Again in Riley, the Court noted that fraud could
not be inferred from percentages retained versus paid to the solicitor
because charities might benefit from the act of solicitation itself.62 The
request for funds can convey information and include cause-oriented

51. Id. at 947.
52. Id. at 966.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 967.
55. Id. at 961 n.9 (citing Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S.
620, 624 (1980)).
56. Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
57. Id. at 785.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 784-85.
60. Id. at 801.

61. Id.
62. Id. at 798-99.
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advocacy.63
Riley also struck down a disclosure provision in the North Carolina
statute that required solicitors to reveal the average of the percentage of
gross receipts actually paid by a professional solicitor to its charitable
clients in the prior 12 months. 4 The Court said these upfront disclosures
could result in the solicitation ending before it ever started.65 The
possibility that these state-mandated disclosures would cause potential
contributors to immediately hang up presented too chilling an effect on the
speech. The less restrictive alternative was for the State to publish
charitable financial disclosures and to vigorously prosecute fraudulent
66
misrepresentation when it arose.
According to the Court's charitable solicitation trilogy, nonprofit
solicitation enjoys the highest First Amendment protection. This free
speech standard applies whether the solicitation is conducted by the charity
itself or by a paid agent. The Court will assume that nonprofit solicitation
includes informational and advocacy messages. Regulations cannot
presume fraud in these solicitation attempts by paid fundraisers, even if the
presumption could be rebutted. The State can address fraud prevention
through regular financial disclosures by charities. Actual fraudulent
misrepresentations can be prosecuted when they occur.
This was the legal framework for the Supreme Court in 2003, when it
revisited the issue of fraudulent charitable telephone solicitations
conducted by for-profit telemarketers.67 In Madigan v. Telemarketing
Associates, Inc., the state of Illinois pursued fraud cases against for-profit
solicitors operating on behalf of Vietnam veterans organizations.68
According to Illinois, paid fundraisers falsely represented in solicitation
calls that a significant amount of each dollar donated would be used to
assist veterans. In fact, 85 percent of contributions would either be paid to
the solicitor or used by the organizations for administrative expenses. 69
Additionally, Illinois asserted that, when asked by potential donors about
the allocation of funds to actual veterans, some of the solicitors misstated
the facts.70
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 798.
Id.
Id. at 799-800.
Id. at 800.
Madigan v. Telemktg. Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600 (2003).
Id.
Id. at 605.
Id. at 600.

Number 11]

NONPROFITSOLICITATION

Illinois did not allege that the percentage retained by the
telemarketing firm was so excessive as to amount to fraud, which would
have directly violated the Court's rulings in the Schaumburg trilogy. The
Supreme Court described the case as one "when nondisclosure is
accompanied by intentionally misleading statements designed to deceive
the listener."'"
When it reversed the Illinois Supreme Court's decision to dismiss the
claim, the Court in Madigan emphasized that the complaint did not simply
stem from the percentage the for-profit solicitor charged, as in
Schaumburg.72 Further, the case was not limited to the statement that a
"significant amount" of each contribution would go to charitable
purposes.7 In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia (joined by Justice
Thomas) stated that if the allegation of fraud was based on this statement,
coupled with the fundraiser's 85 percent fee, the fraud claim would violate
the First Amendment.74
Illinois presented two fact-based misstatements. One donor was
falsely told that "90% or more goes to the vets. '7' Another donor was told
that donations were not used for "'labor expenses' because 'all members
are volunteers."' 76 These "particular representations made with intent to
mislead," provided the Court with distinguishable facts from the
Schaumburg trilogy.77 Madigan could survive a motion to dismiss.
Madigan seems to apply the Schaumburg charitable solicitation
trilogy as it was intended. In Schaumburg, Munson, and Riley, the Court
emphasized that the way to protect the public from fraudulent solicitation
was not to legislate against potential fraud in ways that restrict the act of
solicitation. The way to protect the public from fraudulent solicitation is to
prosecute actual fraudulent misrepresentations. Madigan emphasized that
the fraud claim included nondisclosure plus actual misstatements. Neither
the fee amount, nor nondisclosure of the fee, was the basis for the fraud
claim.
In Madigan, Justice Scalia's concurrence emphasized that general
statements about the "significant" portion of donations that would go to the
71. Id. at 606. The action was appealed on a motion to dismiss. Therefore, the Court
would only decide if such an action was permissible, not whether any of the statements were
actually true.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 605 (quoting Illinois' complaint).
74. Id. at 624-25 (Scalia, J., concurring).
75. Id. at 608.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 621.
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charity could not be prosecuted as fraud.7 ' This follows the Riley analysis
that the state cannot impose disclosure requirements that effectively block
the organization's attempt to solicit. If the "significant" statement could be
pursued as fraud, the state would be using its prosecutorial power to decide
what is or is not "significant." This is the same judgment that legislators
had made in the statutes overturned by the Schaumburg trilogy. Madigan
states that state attorneys general cannot achieve in case-by-case litigation
the same solicitation constraints that legislators had attempted in the
Schaumburg trilogy.7 9
Madigan is consistent with the Schaumburg approach that
prophylactic fraud regulations governing charitable solicitation are
unconstitutional. Other regulatory measures, specifically after-the-fact
enforcement of specific misrepresentations, as well as general nonprofit
financial disclosures, may be the only government restrictions on nonprofit
solicitation that are justified by the anti-fraud interest.
As noted above, only the disclosure provisions for nonprofits in the
TSR seem to be directly motivated by the fraud prevention concern. The
time-of-day, do-not-call, and autodial restrictions all target in-home
privacy.80 The disclosure provisions for nonprofits in the TSR are not as
obstructive of the message as those invalidated in Riley. The USA
PATRIOT Act required telemarketers to disclose that the purpose of a call
is to solicit a charitable contribution.8 ' The Act also permitted the FTC to
include any other such disclosures that the Commission considered
appropriate. such as the name and mailing address of the charity for whom
the solicitation is made.82 The FTC adopted the congressionally-mandated
disclosure that a call is for the purpose of soliciting a charitable
contribution and also required disclosure of the charity for which the
solicitation is made. The amended rule does not require disclosure of the
charity's mailing address.8 3
78. Id. at 624-25.
79. Id. at 617.
80. In Mainstream Marketing, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the national Do-NotCall Registry advances the fraud objective. However, this analysis was expressly based on
the commercial nature of the callers governed by that provision of the rule. The court
accepted the FTC's conclusion that callers conducting noncommercial solicitation are less
likely to resort to deceptive and abusive practices than commercial callers. Accordingly, the
national Do-Not-Call Registry eliminates the more likely source of deceptive, abusive
callers-the commercial solicitors. Mainstream Mktg. Servs. v. FTC, 358 F.3d 1228, 1241
(10th Cir. 2004).
81. USA PATRIOT Act § 101 l(b)(2)(D) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6102).
82. Id.
83. FTC Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 4580, 4649 (Jan. 29, 2003) (codified
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Disclosure of the name of a charity would seem to be a basic
necessity in legitimate nonprofit solicitation. These messages seek a
transaction (usually of money), which is almost impossible to accomplish
without some disclosure of identifying information. The most undemanding
donor would likely require the name of the charity before agreeing to make
a donation. Unlike the disclosure requirements overturned in Riley, the
requirement of a solicitor to disclose the name of the organization for
which a contribution is sought certainly does not undermine the message's
effectiveness. On the contrary, the TSR only seems to codify what is
probably a basic necessity for successful solicitation.
Disclosure of the name of the charity is a narrowly tailored
requirement that is an absolute necessity for law enforcement to investigate
money laundering under the USA PATRIOT Act. Although the First
Amendment protects the right to speak anonymously, cases dealing with
anonymous speech acknowledge the government's right to a "limited
identification" requirement.84 This provision of the nonprofit TSR should
be permissible.
B.

Privacy as a Compelling Interest to Support Regulation of
Nonprofit Solicitation under the TSR

In addition to fraud protection, the FTC justifies its new nonprofit
telemarketing restrictions on the government's interest in protecting
personal privacy." The Do-Not-Call List requirement, the time-of-day
restrictions and the autodialing restrictions are all more obviously directed
at protecting in-home privacy than preventing fraud. Again, all of these
provisions apply only to nonprofit solicitation conducted by commercial
telemarketers.
The restriction on calling only between 8:00 a.m. and 9:00 p.m. has
been the law for commercial solicitation since the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act of 1991.86 Charitable solicitation was exempt from that
regulation, but is now covered under the TSR. The technical mandates in
the TSR govern the use of autodialing equipment. Such equipment is
commonly used by commercial telemarketing service providers. These
"predictive" dialers automate the dialing process so that a new call is
always at the ready when the telemarketer ends the current call. When the
prediction is flawed, the consumer's phone rings only to have no one on the
at 16 C.F.R. pt. 310).
84. McIntyre v. Ohio Election Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 353 (1995).
85. See discussion supra Section II.
86. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)(1) (2003).
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other end because the telemarketer is still on the previous call. Usually the
autodialer then hangs up on the consumer. The TSR technical requirements
address these dead-air and hang-up issues.87
The do-not-call regulation for charitable solicitation requires the
commercial solicitor to maintain an organization-specific list of numbers
that do not want to receive solicitation calls. 8 The organization must
maintain the list and abide by those do-not-call demands for five years.8 9
Most of the Supreme Court's statements on privacy and free speech
came in cases in which the Court upheld privacy as a substantial interest
that justifies restrictions on commercial speech. For example, the Supreme
Court upheld a federal statute empowering a homeowner to bar mailings
from specific senders by notifying the Postmaster General that she wished
to receive no further mailings from that sender.9" In Rowan v. United States
Post Office Department, the Court acknowledged that one of the tenets of
free speech was to protect the rights of unpopular speakers to convey their
messages.9 1 Nevertheless, such a right "stops at the outer boundary of every
person's domain."9 The FTC heavily relies on Rowan as support for
it
schemes, although
do-not-call
regulatory
customer-initiated
acknowledges that Rowan was a case involving commercial advertising for
sexually-explicit materials and may not apply to all unwanted noncommercial messages.93
Similarly, the Supreme Court has approved regulations that punish
door-to-door sellers for failing to honor "no solicitation" signs posted by
citizens.' According to the Court, "[t]his or any similar regulation leaves
the decision as to whether distributors of literature may lawfully call at a
home where it belongs-with the homeowner himself. A city can punish
those who call at a home in defiance of the previously expressed will of the
occupant... ."" Both Rowan and Martin v. City of Struthers, involve
commercial solicitation, and were decided in a time before the Supreme
87. FTC Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. at 4641-45.
88. 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(3)(iii) (2004).
89. FTC Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. at 4640.
90. Rowan v. United States Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728 (1970). The postal
regulation in Rowan actually did not distinguish that the list was limited to commercial
mailings, but was widely understood to have been adopted to provide homeowners a vehicle
to block mailings for the sale of sexually-explicit material.
91. See Id.
92. Id. at 738.
93. FTC Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. at 4635 n.674.
94. See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143-44 (1943).
95. Id. at 148.
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Court had expressly extended any First Amendment protection to
commercial speech.
Frisby v. Schultz is one of the most commonly cited, modem noncommercial speech cases in which the Supreme Court concluded that inhome privacy was a compelling interest to justify some speech
restrictions.9 6 The case involved targeted picketing by abortion protestors at

doctors' homes or offices. The Court stated, "[I]ndividuals are not required
to welcome unwanted speech into their own homes."97 Accordingly, the

case is held out as support for consumer-initiated do-not-call restrictions.9 8
By contrast, in 2002, the Supreme Court invalidated an ordinance that
required anyone who wanted to engage in door-to-door canvassing or
soliciting to obtain a city permit.99 Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of
New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton was a religious speech case and the
Court suggested that the ordinance might have been constitutional if it had
been limited to commercial speech." ° The regulation at issue in
Watchtower included a separate provision for residents to post "No
Solicitation" signs on their homes that canvassers had to honor. 01 The
provision most closely analogous to the in-house do-not-call list
requirement in the TSR was not challenged in Watchtower and, therefore,
was not addressed by the Court.
None of these Supreme Court precedents has directly addressed the
issue of whether in-home privacy is a compelling interest to justify
regulations that preempt non-commercial messages from coming into the
home via the telephone. Arguably, intrusion via the telephone is far less
frustrating to privacy than picketers outside one's home or solicitors at the
door. The FTC ignored this distinction when it relied on these precedents in
support of its nonprofit do-not-call rule.
Competing with the personal privacy right is the established principle
that the messages of nonprofit organizations do not simply inform the
consumer of giving opportunities, but additionally promote the ideas and
activities that these organizations undertake on behalf of entire
communities. When these messages are preemptively blocked based on a
government-enforced do-not-call requirement, important information and
96. 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
97. Id. at 485. See also Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980).
98. Michael E. Shannon, Combating Unsolicited Sales Calls: The "Do Not Call"
Approach to Solving the Telemarketing Problem, 27 J. LEGIS. 381 (2001).
99. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002).
100. Id. at 165.
101. Id. at 156-57.
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dialogue is lost about social issues or needs and how these charities meet
those needs. Perhaps the needs of individuals to remain preemptively
unperturbed by this limited group of telephone calls is not a compelling
enough interest in the face of society's need to ensure that charities survive
and thrive.
Further, the FTC's do-not-call rule for nonprofits preempts all future
possible calling for five years. The length of this restriction has a
completely chilling effect on the ability of nonprofit organizations to solicit
donations in response to crises or disasters. Americans have shown time
and again their abundant generosity to charities." 2 Presumably, that
generosity would prevail over the privacy interest, especially under exigent
circumstances. Yet, the nonprofit do-not-call requirement provides no safe
harbors, nor exceptions for such circumstances. Nothing in the Court's
privacy jurisprudence suggests that a government-enforced, five-year ban
on nonprofit speech is compelled by the in-home privacy interest, even if
the ban is triggered by a consumer request rather than a direct government
restraint.
Even assuming in-home privacy is a compelling interest to justify
restrictions on non-commercial speech, the do-not-call list-keeping
requirement now imposed on nonprofits still must withstand the second
part of the First Amendment analysis: it must be narrowly tailored to
satisfy the compelling interest without unduly burdening speech. °3
Arguably, the FTC approach faces several problems under this part of the
First Amendment analysis with respect to the Do-Not-Call List, although
the other new provisions of the TSR for nonprofits are likely to stand.
C.

Narrow Tailoring of the TSR

First, as was noted above,"° the FTC interprets its statutory authority
under the USA PATRIOT Act as limited to nonprofit solicitation
conducted by commercial solicitors. When examining the impact of these
new privacy restrictions, the distinction between solicitation by commercial
102. See, e.g., Robert A. Katz, A Pig in a Python: How Charitable Response to
September 11 Overwhelmed the Law of Disaster Relief, 36 IND. L. REV. 251, 252 (2003).
See also Alice Gresham Bullock, Taxes, Social Policy and Philanthropy: The Untapped
Potential of Middle- and Low-Income Generosity, 6 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 325, 341

(1997) (explaining that less wealthy individuals contribute a higher portion of their income
to charity and households earning a small share of total income account for a
disproportionate share of all contributions).
103. See, e.g., United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 203 (2003); United
States v. Playboy Entm't Group, 529 U.S. 803, 807 (2000).
104. See discussion supra Section II.
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telemarketers and calling by the charity's own employees or volunteers
presents a dichotomy that must be addressed.
The time-of-day limitation now applicable to charitable solicitation
can survive this constitutional scrutiny. This privacy protection reflects a
content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction. 105 It allows solicitation
to continue during the substantial portion of the day and evening, when
calling typically occurs. The restriction does not pose a substantially
different constraint on charities that hire a commercial solicitor, since most
organizations conducting solicitation through their own employees or
volunteers would likely abide by similar time limits. The time limits are a
practical matter and good solicitation practice, whether the caller is a paid
professional or the charity's own volunteer or employee." °6 As such, this
provision does not present an unconstitutional restriction for the charities
that hire commercial telemarketers.
Similarly, the technical mandates for predictive dialers can also be
characterized as time, place, and manner restrictions. All commercial
telemarketers must comply with the technical mandates in the course of
their solicitation business. Admittedly, compliance with these technical
mandates creates new expenses that will apply to telemarketing solicitation.
Presumably, all the customers of these commercial telemarketers are going
to have to absorb the expense of these new technical requirements. This is
the new reality of any party, nonprofit or otherwise, that hires a commercial
telemarketing firm. This reality would affect the nonprofit telemarketing
client regardless of whether the TSR covered charitable solicitation or not.
Like the time-of-day restrictions, the technical mandates would seem to
improve the interaction between the caller and the potential donor. Thus,
the mandates do not undermine the charities' potential effectiveness at
fundraising.
Regarding the in-house do-not-call list, however, the distinction
between charitable solicitation done by the charity's own volunteers and
solicitation by commercial telemarketers presents a questionable
dichotomy. This rule is not a time, place, and manner restriction. It is a
mandate that limits some charitable calling in ways not applicable to other
charities that do not hire professional telemarketers. Courts will strictly
scrutinize any regulatory classification when "the classification

105. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
106. See Jeffrey LeBlanc, Why Making the Best Call is the Right Call for You, FUND
RAISING MGMT., Oct. 1998, at 34; Tim Twardowski, The Sounds of Success, FUND RAISING
MGMT., Aug. 1997, at 19.
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impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right." 107 In
this case, the fundamental right is free speech. Under the strict scrutiny
analysis, it may be hard for the FTC to justify its regulatory scheme in
which telephone consumers can receive no privacy protection when called
by volunteer telemarketers; their do-not-call requests must be honored only
by a charity using a paid telemarketing firm.
In the era before the Telemarketing Act, the TCPA or the TSR, one
state court pointed out the illogic of placing restrictions on a limited group
of professional solicitors when solicitation by charity volunteers and
political organizations went unrestricted. °8 The court struck down such a
restriction on professional solicitation, stating that it did "virtually nothing"
to protect privacy." The FCC was confronted with this constitutional
problem of commercial versus nonprofit solicitation when it considered and
rejected adopting a national Do-Not-Call Registry in the 1980s." °
The FTC begs the question when it addresses this issue. The
Commission asserts that the amended TSR treats all calling by commercial
telemarketers the same. "The company-specific 'do-not-call' provisions
apply equally to all for-profit solicitors, regardless of whether they are
seeking sales of goods or services or charitable contributions ... .""' As
such, the list-keeping requirement is content-neutral. There is no dichotomy
in the speech restriction created by the mandate, according to the FTC. The
Maryland Federal District Court has accepted this interpretation by the
2
FTC regarding the scope of its statutory authority.1
This analysis, however, ignores the conclusion in Riley, that
solicitation by a commercial party on behalf of a nonprofit is entitled to the
same First Amendment protection as if the nonprofit organization were
speaking for itself. In Riley, as in the TSR, the regulation was drafted to
directly regulate the commercial solicitor, not the nonprofit agency. That
legislative approach, however, did not shield the regulation from the same
scrutiny the Court had applied in Schaumburg and Munson.
Under the new TSR, if a nonprofit party is calling on its own behalf, it
will be totally unregulated. But when the nonprofit party opts to use a
107. Massachusetts Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976).
108. Planned Parenthood League v. Attorney Gen., 464 N.E.2d 55 (Mass. 1984).
109. Id. at 61.
110. Mark S. Nadel, Rings of Privacy: Unsolicited Telephone Calls and the Right of
Privacy, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 99, 110 (1986).
111. FTC Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 4580, 4636 (Jan. 29, 2003) (codified
at 16 C.F.R. pt. 310).
112. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind v. FTC, 303 F. Supp. 2d 707. 713 (D. Md. 2004)
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commercial soliciting agent, it will be restricted by the do-not-call
requirement. The FTC and the Maryland Federal District Court ignored
Riley when they sidestepped this obvious dichotomy by focusing only on
the rule's "commercial" scope.
To support the national Do-Not-Call Registry (including the
exemptions for charitable calling and political polling) the FTC argued that
commercial telemarketers are more likely to engage in abusive calling
practices than nonprofit organizations. In Mainstream Marketing Services
v. Federal Trade Commission, the Tenth Circuit accepted the FTC's
premise that the profit motive of commercial callers could result in more
abusive, deceptive telemarketing, whereas the need to promote their causes
3
would constrain nonprofits from the same behavior."
4
Accepting the validity of this analysis for the moment," the
comparison between for-profit and nonprofit solicitation does not support
the TSR charitable do-not-call requirement. The nonprofit in-house no call
list can only be supported by evidence that commercial parties calling on
behalf of charities are more likely to engage in deceptive and abusive
calling than volunteers and nonprofit employees calling on behalf of
charities. Of course, no such evidence existed in the FTC rulemaking
record. Nor is any such evidence likely to be found if the FTC's own
premise is correct: solicitation on behalf of a nonprofit cause requires
special attention to promoting the cause, and not alienating the potential
donor." 5 If this premise is true, it is equally true whether the calling is done
by the charity itself or by the professional solicitor.
As the Schaumburg trilogy revealed, professional solicitors usually
get paid a percentage of the revenue generated. If that revenue (donations)
is linked to the attitude of the public toward the cause, as the FTC
surmised, then the commercial solicitor would be as motivated as the
nonprofit organization not to deceive or abuse the called party.
Accordingly, the TSR arbitrarily restricts the free speech of certain
charities based on the agents they hire to make their calls, without any
suggestion that this restriction bears any relationship to the fraud or privacy
interests the rule purports to protect.
A North Dakota Federal District Court addressed a similar bifurcated
6
statutory provision in its state charitable solicitation law.'" In general, the
law established a state Do-Not-Call Registry that solicitors were prohibited
113.
114.
115.
116.

358 F.3d 1228, 1241 (10th Cir. 2004)
See discussion infra Section IV.
FTC Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. at 4637.
Fraternal Order of Police v. Stenehjem, 287 F. Supp. 2d 1023 (D.N.D. 2003).
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from calling. Exempt from the prohibition were calls made by volunteers or
employees of charitable organizations. 117 Accordingly, the statute was
similar to the federal TSR in that its provisions only applied to charitable
solicitation performed by an outside firm or individual, likely to be a paid
commercial solicitor. The North Dakota court held that the regulation
imposes a direct and substantial limitation on the charity's solicitation
activity because it "prevents charities from hiring professional
telemarketers to solicit funds for them."'1 8 Accordingly, the court applied
the strictest free speech scrutiny.
The North Dakota court also concluded that the state's regulation was
not narrowly tailored to satisfy either the anti-fraud or privacy interest. The
court explained that state criminal fraud laws directly protected the state's
interest in protecting its citizens against fraud but the do-not-call law
blocked all calls by paid solicitors to numbers on the list. Because not
every professional telemarketer will commit fraud, the law targets and
eliminates more "than the exact source of the evil it seeks to remedy.""' 9
This analysis echoes the Schaumburg trilogy and Madigan.
Regarding the privacy interest, the North Dakota court held that
unrestricted charitable solicitation from volunteers or employees of
charities proved that the restriction on nonprofit solicitations by
commercial fundraisers was not narrowly drawn to serve the privacy
interest. 2 0
For the reasons stated above, the TSR's organization-specific do-notcall list fails as a narrowly-tailored regulation that protects the in-home
privacy interest of consumers. The FTC spoke at length regarding the
failures of the original TSR do-not-call provisions: "The record in this
matter overwhelmingly shows ...that the company-specific approach is
seriously inadequate to protect consumers' privacy. .".' These failures
justified the Commission's decision to create the new national Do-Not-Call
Registry for commercial telemarketers. How can such a flawed regulatory
approach as the in-house rule now become a legitimate privacy-protection
vehicle, especially under the strict scrutiny for charitable speech?
Again, the FTC's answer was that the nature of charitable solicitation
is qualitatively different than commercial telemarketing because the call is
117. Id. at 1025.
118. Id. at 1029 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-28-01(7)(c) (2003)).
119. Id. (quoting Thorbum v. Austin, 231 F.3d 1114, 1120 (8th Cir. 2000)).
120. Id.
121. FTC Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 4580, 4631 (Jan. 29, 2003) (codified
at 16 C.F.R. pt. 310).
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not just about the contribution but the cause. To ignore the do-not-call
requests of consumers in such a context potentially alienates the called
party against the cause, not just the caller. Such a difference in calling
motives would render the charity-specific, list-keeping mandate more
effective than the former company-specific lists, according to the FTC. ,22
Notwithstanding the support of a lone commenter in the rulemaking
process, the Commission's reliance on this alleged fundamental difference
between commercial and nonprofit solicitation flies in the face of modern
marketing research. For over thirty years, marketing scholars have
contended that classic marketing concepts apply equally to nonprofit
solicitation.123 Regardless of the commercial or noncommercial nature of
the speaker, marketing proposes an exchange.' 24 In fact, some nonprofit
organizations may be offering to25 exchange goods or services for money,
just like for-profit organizations.
Further, while the marketing literature acknowledges the unique
difficulty nonprofits have in persuading individuals to exchange old ideas
or behaviors for new ones, 126 studies do not support the FTC's assumption
that nonprofits are more customer-oriented than commercial sector
marketers. 27 "In fact, existing entities are still seen to be content with their
nonprofit offer, irrespective of what their beneficiaries or those whom they
sustain economically may think. This attitude' 28is justified by the maxim 'we
know better than you what is good for you. "
Courts can set aside the factual conclusions of an administrative
agency if those fact-findings are arbitrary, capricious, or unsupported by
substantial evidence.' 29 In this case, the FTC's factual conclusions about
122. FTC Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. at 4637.
123. See Philip Kotler & Sidney J. Levy, Broadening the Concept of Marketing, 33 J.
MKTG. 10 (1969).

124. PHILIP KOTLER & ALAN R. ANDREASEN, STRATEGIC MARKETING FOR NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS 25 (3rd ed. 1987).

125. Id. at 30.
126. Michael L. Rothschild, Marketing Communications in Nonbusiness Situations or
Why It's So Hardto Sell Brotherhood Like Soap, 43 J. MKTG. 11 (1979).
127. See John H. Hanson, Breaking the Cycle of Marketing Disinvestment: Using Market
Research to Build OrganisationalAlliances, 6 INT'L J. NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR
MKTG. 33 (2001); Mike Riley & Jim McCullough, A Survey of Marketing Activity in
Nonprofit Organizations, in NON-PROFIT MARKETING: CONCEPTUAL AND EMPIRICAL
RESEARCH 40 (F. Kelly Shuptrine & Peter H. Reingen eds., 1983).

128. Luis Ignacio Alvarez Gonzilez et al., The Market Orientation Concept in the
Private Nonprofit Organisation Domain, 67 INT'L J. NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR
MKTG. 55, 56-57 (2002) (citing V. Hayden, How to Increase Market Orientation, 7 J.
MGMT. IN MED. 29 (1993)).
129. Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2002).
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nonprofit telemarketing activities could be vulnerable considering that the
FTC has no experience regulating nonprofit operations. Further, the
Commission never gave the public an opportunity to comment on the
efficacy of a do-not-call list-keeping obligation for nonprofit fundraising.
When the nonprofit sector overwhelmingly criticized the proposed national
registry, 3 ' the FTC opted for the organization-specific list-keeping
mandate without any further investigation. Accordingly, the Commission's
sweeping conclusions about nonprofit telemarketing are based on little
factual support and contradict decades of marketing research."'
Finally, the new TSR requires that all commercial telemarketers,
including nonprofit solicitors, not interfere with caller identification
("caller ID") technology to enable telephone consumers to use that
technology as intended to self-select what calls to receive or ignore.'32 The
Tenth Circuit was not persuaded that this technology was a reasonable
alternative for handling the glut of commercial solicitation calls.' 33 When
the caller ID rule is applied to the much smaller volume of nonprofit calls,
however, consumer privacy may be sufficiently protected without
preemptively blocking every charitable message to a phone line. The caller
ID technology allows individual residents the choice of answering or not,
and allows that choice on a call-by-call basis. By contrast, the do-not-call
mandates (national registry and in-house list) ban all future messages from
an organization to all residents at the designated phone number for five
years."34
Caller ID enforcement protects the unquestioned right not to engage
in a telephone conversation (and at least half of all telephone consumers
subscribe to it).'35 The Commission's action regarding enforcement of
caller ID technology may be a narrowly tailored remedy to the privacy
concern that obviates the need for the do-not-call list-keeping requirement
for nonprofit organizations under the strict scrutiny standard that applies to
this free speech.
In Mainstream Marketing, the plaintiffs raised caller ID and call130. FTC Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 4580, 4634 (2003) (codified at 16
C.F.R. pt. 310).
131. None of these issues were examined in the Maryland Federal District Court opinion
upholding the nonprofit TSR provisions.
132. FTC Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. at 4626.
133. Mainstream Mktg. Servs. v. FTC, 358 F.3d 1228, 1245 (10th Cir. 2004).
134. FTC Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. at 4640.
135. FTC Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. at 4626 n.533 (citing Dina
ElBoghdady, Ears Wide Shut: Researchers Get Punishedfor Telemarketers' Crimes, WASH.
POST, Sept. 8, 2002, at H2.)
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blocking technologies as reasonable alternatives to the national Do-NotCall Registry. The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument, however, because
36
it puts the expense of avoiding the calls on the consumer.' Further, for
every advance in call-blocking technology that consumers acquire, the
industry will likely find a mechanism for circumventing it. The court
characterized this approach as a technological arms race between
consumers and the telemarketing industry, not an effective alternative to
the national registry.37

Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit's rejection of the caller ID argument
may be inapplicable to the nonprofit TSR. The Tenth Circuit was analyzing
the national registry based on the commercial speech CentralHudson test,
interest.138
which requires regulatory measures to reasonably fit the asserted
The stricter political/social speech test presumably requires some tighter fit.
Additionally, the Tenth Circuit was concerned about the huge number of
commercial calls the registry would address. In a separate part of its
"reasonable fit" analysis, the court in Mainstream Marketing specifically
calls. 139
contrasted the much smaller volume of noncommercial solicitation
Perhaps no government-enforced, do-not-call list is justified because caller
ID and answering machine screening are sufficient protections for
consumer privacy.
V. CONCLUSION
As was noted above, the FTC did not investigate the impact of the inhouse do-not-call list on charitable solicitation. Specifically, the FTC
adopted it as a fallback position when the nonprofit sector vehemently
protested the national registry during the public comment period. Several
unintended consequences may emerge from the rule as a result of this
unexamined regulation.
First, nonprofit organizations are already battling public
misunderstanding about their exemptions from state do-not-call lists. One
study, conducted before enactment of the new federal do-not-call TSR,
showed that 88 percent of consumers believed that their do-not-call
4
requests were binding on nonprofit organizations." This misunderstanding
136. Mainstream Mktg Servs. v. FTC, 358 F.3d 1228, 1245 (10th Cir. 2004).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1236.
139. Id. at 1240.
140. Curt J. Dommeyer & Barbara L. Gross, What Consumers Know and What They Do:
An Investigation of Consumer Knowledge, Awareness, and Use of Privacy Protection
Strategies, 17 J. INTERACTIVE MKTG. 34, 41 (2003).
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is only likely to be exacerbated by a federal rule that applies to some
charitable solicitation calls but not others.
Further, the FTC instilled additional potential for misunderstanding
by its comments regarding "percent of purchase" contributions. In these
solicitation programs, charitable contributions are sought in connection
with the purchase of a good or service, with a portion of the price going to
the charity. Are these solicitations treated like commercial sales calls
covered by the national registry, or like charitable solicitations covered
only by the charity's in-house do-not-call list? Here is the FTC's answer:
[W]hen the transaction predominantly is an inducement to make a
charitable contribution, such as when an incentive of nominal value is
offered in return for a donation, the telemarketer should proceed as if
the call were exclusively to induce a charitable contribution. Similarly,
if the call is predominantly to induce the purchase of goods or services,
but, for example, some portion of the proceeds from this sale will
benefit a charitable organization, the telemarketer should adhere to the
portions of the Rule relevant to sellers of goods or services.' 41
With this ambiguous regulatory guidance, commercial telemarketers
might refuse to accept nonprofit clients who want to undertake this type of
fundraising plan because of the risk of regulatory noncompliance.
Nonprofit organizations might be forced to alter their marketing plans that
had previously included these "percentage of purchase" components.
In the face of potential $11,000 fines for violating do-not-call
registrations,142 commercial telemarketers might just conclude, out of
misunderstanding or for the sake of efficiency, to lump their nonprofit
clients into the same do-not-call treatment as for-profit clients. Then, the
charities' calling lists would be "scrubbed" based on the entire national
database, resulting in needlessly restricting access to these households. At
the same time organizations doing their own calling with employees or
volunteers are free to call anyone and everyone.
Although a variety of factors can go into the choice to outsource a
telemarketing fundraising drive, 141 it is widely assumed that smaller, local
charities must use commercial solicitors because they have fewer
employees and volunteers to conduct fundraising calls versus large
nonprofits. The do-not-call restrictions on these smaller charities could
141. FTC Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 4580, 4590 (2003) (codified at 16
C.F.R. pt. 310).
142. Harvy Lipman, Charities Exempted from Planfor U.S. 'Do Not Call' List, CHRON.
PHILANTHROPY 27 (Jan. 9, 2003).
143. Paul Papich, The How To's of Telefund-Raising for the Annual Fund and Beyond,
FUND RAISING MGMT., Oct. 2000, at 35, 36.
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have unforeseen effects on donation patterns for local needs or lesserknown causes. In other words, the very organizations that need more
exposure to accomplish their missions are the ones prevented from
unfettered calling. These issues were never examined by the FTC.
Instead of a government-enforcement mechanism to preemptively
thwart a charity's opportunity to persuade about the importance of its
charitable mission, individual consumers can continue to decline to receive
these messages ad hoc. Consumers can use blocking measures such as
caller ID and answering machine screening, or they can mute the telephone
bell at inconvenient times. They can ask charitable solicitors to forward
solicitation material by mail, rather than calling again. They can decline to
listen to the message, without expecting relief from future calling for the
next five years. Or they can listen to the message and consider if the work
of the charitable organization aligns with their own values. If so, they
should consider contributing-another act of protected free speech!
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